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Abstract—Increased interest in scalable and high-throughput
blockchains has led to an explosion in the number of commit-
tee selection methods in the literature. Committee selection
mechanisms allow consensus protocols to safely select a com-
mittee, or a small subset of validators that is permitted to vote
and verify a block of transactions, in a distributed ledger.
There are many such mechanisms, each with substantially
different methodologies and guarantees on communication
complexity, resource usage, and fairness. In this paper, we
illustrate that, despite these implementation-level differences,
there are strong statistical similarities between committee
selection mechanisms. We concretely show this by proving
that the committee selection of the Avalanche consensus
protocol can be used to choose committees in the Stellar
Consensus Protocol that satisfy the necessary and sufficient
conditions for Byzantine agreement. We also verify these
claims using simulations and numerically observe sharp
phase transitions as a function of protocol parameters. Our
results suggest the existence of a ‘statistical taxonomy’ of
committee selection mechanisms in distributed consensus
algorithms.
Index Terms—Cryptocurrencies, Distributed Consensus Pro-
tocol, Committee Selection, Stellar Consensus Protocol,
Avalanche
1. Introduction
Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) algorithms provide a
robust, resilient way for a group of n networked partici-
pants to come to agreement on an ordered series of trans-
actions, known as a ledger. Although existing algorithms,
such as PBFT [1] or Paxos [2], provide strong safety
guarantees for transactions, they do this at the expense
of performance (e.g. transaction rate), permissioning (the
identities of all nodes must be known at all times) and
synchrony assumptions. In recent years, there has been
a burst of interest in distributed consensus algorithms
that provide weaker safety guarantees but can achieve
higher transaction rates and reduced bandwidth usage.
These algorithms, inspired by the empirical success of the
Nakamoto consensus mechanism used in Bitcoin, com-
bine advances in cryptography and distributed systems to
achieve high performance and low bandwidth usage while
providing tail-bounds on the probability of a successful
attack (see [3]–[5]). Such protocols (including Bitcoin)
often reduce the BFT requirement, which purports that
an algorithm is resistant to arbitrary Byzantine attackers,
to specific assumptions about the ways that bad actors
can misbehave. Given the low transaction rates of live
networks, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Tezos, there
has been an uptick in research that aims to improve the
scalability of blockchain protocols so that they can be used
as a general compute platform [6]–[8].
One of the key improvements common to most
blockchain scaling solutions is the committee selection
mechanism. Committee selection mechanisms allow users
to coordinate and choose a small committee of users with-
out knowing the identities of all other participants. The
committee is then allowed to append transactions to the
ledger while collecting transaction fees and/or block min-
ing rewards. There are three major camps of committee
selection, each with substantially different methodologies
and guarantees: the first camp uses selection to choose
a small set of validators who achieve consensus via a
standard Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) algorithm; the
second uses selection to assign validators / miners to
specific chains; and the last allows users explicitly decide
the validators that they trust.
Distinct committee selection mechanisms can pro-
vide dramatically different guarantees in terms of ease
of implementation, fairness, communication complexity,
resource usage, and number of rounds of multi-party
computation. On one side, social committee selection
mechanisms such as Ripple [9], where individual nodes
choose which nodes they want to reach consensus with,
provide minimal fairness1, communication, or multi-party
computation (MPC) bounds, but are much easier to imple-
ment and let users directly control their resource usage.
Conversely, protocols such as Algorand [11], [12] — the
first camp of protocols that use a small committee of
constant or logarithmic size to perform traditional BFT
— rely on public randomness to perform a cryptographic
sortition of users. These protocols require much more
coordinated communication, but provide stronger fairness
guarantees. The final camp of committee selection meth-
ods are from protocols that have multiple chains or shards
that each require their own set of validators [7], [13]. In
this setting, committee selection corresponds to assigning
each of the n participants to k chains in a way that is as
close to random as possible. The goal of using randomness
in committee selection is to ensure that the protocol is
censorship resistant by making it probabilistically impos-
1. In this context, fairness refers to a node receiving p ±  ∈ (0, 1)
percent of the rewards (fees and block rewards) if the node commits a
fraction p ∈ (0, 1) of the resources committed to verification [10]
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sible for a validator to use an attack, such as a grinding
attack, to choose the shard that they get assigned to. In
many of these protocols, committee selection is performed
repeatedly every T epochs in order to ensure a stronger
form of censorship resistance that is insensitive to adaptive
adversaries [14].
From a more pragmatic point of view, protocol de-
signers are faced with a variety of trade-offs when choos-
ing a committee selection mechanism. Those concerned
with fairness will end up increasing their compute and
communication costs and often have to change their Sybil
resistance mechanism in response. For example, Algorand
requires a common coin (a public randomness beacon
for all participants, not just the committee) in order to
guarantee both fairness and liveness (under asynchrony).
This coin, while only used in scenarios under which a rare
timeout condition is hit, has a non-trivial cost in terms of
ease of implementation and communication complexity.
Optimizing these trade-offs ends up tightly coupling the
Sybil resistance mechanism to the committee selection
mechanism. Intuitively, this suggests that committee selec-
tion mechanisms are incomparable, in that their guarantees
become tightly coupled to the protocol(s) they are used
with.
In this paper, we show that it is possible for two seem-
ingly disparate committee selections mechanisms to be
statistically similar. Specifically, we show that Avalanche
[15], a protocol that uses multiple rounds of MPC, can
be used to generate committees for a social consen-
sus protocol, the Stellar Consensus Protocol [16], that
provides BFT guarantees under certain conditions (see
§2.2). Our methods for showing that these two protocols
are similar are probabilistic in nature. Avalanche utilizes
private randomness to allow a participant to randomly
sample other participants votes. In order to replicate
this mechanism, we outline a generative model for the
Avalanche sampling procedure, allowing us to transform
Avalanche samples into Stellar’s notion of a ‘socially
trusted consensus group’, or quorum slice. Then, through
both numerical estimates and theoretical arguments, we
show the existence of a phase transition for when quorum
slices from Avalanche satisfy the liveness and safety guar-
antees of Stellar. Our results suggest that there are more
commonalities between committee selection mechanisms
than previously thought, and illustrate the importance of
numerical simulation for designing committee selection
mechanisms.
2. Stellar and Avalanche Protocols
2.1. Definitions
We first describe the member preference model used
by many Federated Byzantine Agreement (FBA) algo-
rithms.
Definition 2.1. A Federated Byzantine Agreement System
(FBAS) is a pair (V,Q), where V is a set of participants,
and Q is a quorum slice function Q : V → 22V , with
v ∈ S for all S ∈ Q(v).
The quorum slice function Q maps each vertex v to
a set of one or more quorum slices. Intuitively, a quorum
slice for node v is a sufficient set of nodes for v to
reach agreement. For example, in a traditional Byzantine
agreement system [17], every node has the quorum slices
Q(v) = {{v} ∪ S : S ⊂ V, |S| ≥ 23 |V |} and as such,
has same set of quorum slices as every other node, i.e.
Q(v) = Q(w) for all vertices v, w.
Definition 2.2. A quorum is a set of nodes U ⊂ V such
that, for all v ∈ U , there exists some S ∈ Q(v) with
S ⊂ U .
In other words, a quorum is a set of nodes which can
reach agreement without input from any other node in the
system. In a traditional Byzantine agreement system with
3n+ 1 nodes, any 2n+ 1 of the nodes form a quorum.
We can rephrase Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 in the lan-
guage of graph theory by appealing to directed hyper-
graphs [18].
Definition 2.3. A FBAS is a directed hypergraph H =
(V,E), whose hyperedges are of the form (v, T ) for T ⊂
V and v ∈ T . A quorum is a set U ⊂ V such that, for
all v ∈ U , there exists some edge e = (v, T ) incident to
v, with T ⊂ U .
Two important properties of an FBAS are safety and
liveness, which we define below.
Definition 2.4 (Safety). A set of nodes in an FBAS exhibits
safety if no two nodes externalize different values at the
same time.
Definition 2.5 (Liveness). A node in an FBAS exhibits
liveness if it can externalize a value without the partici-
pation of any adversarial nodes.
2.2. Stellar Consensus Protocol
The Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP) [16] works to
preserve BFT guarantees by only requiring consensus
among a series of subset of users. In an n user BFT
algorithm, one necessarily has Ω(n2) messages sent across
the network unless routing assumptions can be made. SCP
relaxes this by giving each network participant the ability
to choose their own quorum slices — groups of other
network participants that they place their trust in. System-
wide consensus is then achieved via a modified version
of the Paxos algorithm, where each network participant
only has to achieve consensus within one of their quorum
slices.
Safety and liveness of the SCP are provably guar-
anteed when the FBAS hypergraph satisfies certain edge
intersection constraints. At the heart of these constraints
is the quorum intersection property (QIP).
Definition 2.6. An FBAS has the quorum intersection
property (QIP) if there do not exist disjoint quorums of
the FBAS. That is, U1∩U2 6= ∅ for every pair of quorums
U1, U2.
To write out the guarantees for SCP, we need the
following definition.
Definition 2.7. If H = (V,E) is a FBAS, then for a set
of vertices B ⊂ V , we define the deletion of B in H as
the subgraph HB = (V \B,EB), where
EB = {(v, T \B) | v ∈ V \B and (v, T ) ∈ E}. (2.1)
Figure 1. The Avalanche consensus algorithm.(1) A user broadcasts a transaction via a peer-to-peer network to validators. (2) Each validator, upon
receipt of this transaction, votes on whether to accept or reject i. (3) Each validator samples votes from other participants in the network using
private randomness. (4) Validators repeat this sampling procedure (e.g. sampling with replacement) until they reach an acceptable level of statistical
confidence
Formally, the SCP has the following guarantees for
safety [16].
Theorem 2.8. Let H be an FBAS. Then, the SCP protocol
on H exhibits safety when HS exhibits the QIP for any
set S of adversarial nodes.
Liveness in SCP is also formally guaranteed through
two other technical conditions involving quorum intersec-
tion and the topology of H .
2.3. Avalanche
The Avalanche consensus algorithm [15] achieves con-
sensus via repeated probabilistic sampling. Figure 1 de-
picts how validators interact within Avalanche and solicit
repeated votes from other participants. Avalanche provides
significantly weaker safety guarantees than the SCP, but is
able to achieve a guaranteed communication complexity
of O(kn log n), where k is a parameter that controls the
statistical accuracy of a user’s local estimate for whether
consensus was reached. The algorithm does this by having
users use private randomness to sample the set of nodes in
the network and decide whether the network has reached
consensus or not after taking enough samples. The authors
of [15] prove, under an assumption of strong network
synchrony, a relationship between the number of samples
each user takes and the maximum tolerance to Byzantine
actors in the system. In this framework, an individual can
tune the number of samples they need to reach consensus
just as a user can tune their quorum slices in the SCP.
The Avalanche algorithm is built up via three previous
algorithms: Slush, Snowflake, and Snowball. Slush con-
tains the underlying ideas of the consensus algorithm and
is a simplified version of the heavy-hitters algorithm [19],
[20] that is adapted for boolean functions. In Slush and
heavy-hitters, the goal is to take samples of size k from
a list L of size N and identify the elements ` ∈ L such
that for some φ ≥ 0, |{i : Li = `}| ≥ φN . For Slush, we
choose φ = 12 . This is done via the following steps:
1) Sample k elements `1, . . . , `k from L.
2) Compute which indices are most likely to be the
majority element of L, i.e. |{i : Li = `}| ≥ N2 ,
based on their frequency in [`1, . . . , `k].
3) Compute a confidence interval for how likely the
most common element seen in [`1, . . . , `k] is the
majority element of L.
4) Repeat the above steps (termed a round) until
the confidence interval shrinks to below a certain
threshold, chosen to maximize the probability
that the chosen element satisfies the majority
condition.
In the case of Slush, the list L consists of the boolean
values of whether the ith node believes that a certain
transaction is valid or not (i.e. the entries of L are either 0
or 1). A node samples from this list by using the peer-to-
peer network to request votes from different participants.
This way, the user doesn’t need to know the whole list,
but instead treats the samples as results from an on-
line sampling method. Snowflake and Snowball improve
upon Slush by reducing the sampling complexity (e.g.
the expected number of rounds needed) via an improved
confidence calculation, and Avalanche uses Snowball to
vote on forks of a directed acyclic graph that represents
the ledger. Avalanche provides much weaker guarantees
than Stellar by replacing safety (Definition 2.4) with:
P1. Safety. No two correct nodes will accept
conflicting transactions
Note that this new condition is weaker than Definition 2.4
as it provides no bound on how long it will take for two
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Figure 2. Plot depicting when QIP holds for the Avalanche generative model with a network size of n = 16
nodes to accept conflicting transactions. This weakened
safety requirement, however, is precisely what allows for
probabilistic sampling. Avalanche ensures fairness locally
in that a participant uses their own randomness source to
sample votes from the rest of the network.
3. Using Avalanche to Generate Quora
In this section, we show that Avalanche can generate
quora that satisfy the Quorum Intersection Property of the
Stellar protocol. Thus, Avalanche achieves liveness and
safety guarantees similar to SCP (Theorem BLAH).
Our goal in this section is to show that, under cer-
tain conditions, Avalanche can generate quora that satisfy
the QIP (Definition 2.6), and thus achieve liveness and
safety guarantees similar to Stellar (Theorem 2.8). Using
numerical simulations, we empirically observe a phase
transition which separates whether or not samples from
the Avalanche generative model exhibit QIP with high
probability (Figure 2). We also formally prove upper and
lower bounds for the phase transition in Theorems 3.1
and 3.2 respectively, which we illustrate in Figure 3.
Our exposition illustrates the importance of numerical
simulation in gaining intuition about phase transitions and
their value in designing committee selection mechanisms.
3.1. Generative Model for Avalanche
We use the following generative model to describe
the randomized quorum selection in Avalanche. Label the
vertices in our network as {1, . . . , n}. For each vertex
v ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
• Let Yv ∼ Poisson(λ).
• Let Av1, . . . , A
v
Yv
be independently drawn k − 1
element subsets of {1, . . . , n} \ v.
• The quorum slices of v are
Qava(v) = {Xv1 , . . . , XvYv}, (3.1)
where Xvi = A
v
i ∪ {v}.
Each vertex draws quorum slices from a hypergeo-
metric distribution, matching the analysis done in [15].
We also use the standard Poissonization technique [21],
[22] to model the number of network samples each node
takes.
3.2. Simulations
We create a network of size n = 16. For k = 2, . . . , 8
and λ = 100, . . . , 104, we draw 10 samples from our
generative model, and test whether those samples satisfy
the QIP. Since the general problem of testing whether
a network satisfies the QIP is NP-complete [23], we
recursively go through all disjoint pairs of subsets of
vertices, checking whether those subsets are quorums.2
We exclude k > n/2 because any two subsets of size k
always intersect. The results of our simulation are shown
in Figure 2.
Interestingly, the phase transition in Figure 2 formal-
izes some of the intuition behind how nodes should choose
quorum slices. If nodes have “too many” quorum slices
(i.e. exponentially many quorum slices), then disjoint
groups of nodes can come to consensus by themselves,
and so system-wide consensus cannot be reached. This
statistical reasoning improves upon the quorum selection
advice of the Stellar paper [16], which states that nodes
should “pick conservative slices that lead to large quo-
rums”.
3.3. Theory
From the simulation results in Figure 2, we see a phase
transition, where QIP holds for λ < f(k), and does not
hold for λ > f(k). Moreover, the results suggests that
f(k) is exponential in k. While the exact form of f is
unclear, we can prove upper and lower bounds for f(k)
(we suspect f(k) = O(nk)). We illustrate our bounds
graphically in Figure 3.
3.3.1. Upper Bound for Phase Transition.
Theorem 3.1. Assume k < n/2. If λ = O(nk log n), then
Qava does not exhibit the quorum intersection property
with high probability.
Proof. Let λ = 2nk log n. We will show that QIP does
not hold by showing that {1, . . . , k} and {k+ 1, . . . , 2k}
are both quora with high probability.
2. We use code from https://github.com/fixxxedpoint/quorum
intersection to perform this check efficiently. For n = 16 it took 40
hours to run on a MacBook Pro with 8GB RAM.
Figure 3. Proven lower and upper bounds for when the Avalanche generative model exhibits QIP. Note that QIP is always achieved for k > n/2.
For v = 1, . . . , k, let Tv be independent geometric ran-
dom variables with probability parameter p =
(
n−1
k−1
)−1
.
Tv represents the number of quorum slices vertex v must
draw before {1, . . . , k} is one of its quorum slices. Thus,
max(T1, . . . , Tk) is the number of quorum slices vertices
v = 1, . . . , k must draw for {1, . . . , k} to be a quora.
Let U1, . . . , Uk be independent exponential random
variables, with rate α = −(log 1− p)−1. Since bUic is
geometric with parameter p, we have P (Ui > t) ≥
P (Ti > t) for any t > 0, and so P (max(U1, . . . , Uk) >
t) ≥ P (max(T1, . . . , Tk) > t). Setting t = lognγ yields
P (max(T1, . . . , Tk) > t) ≤ P (max(U1, . . . , Uk) > t)
= 1− P (max(U1, . . . , Uk) < t)
= 1− P (U1 < t)k
= 1− (1− e− logn)k
= 1− (1− n−1)k
≤ k
n
,
where we use Bernoulli’s inequality in the last line. Thus,
if each vertex in {1, . . . , k} draws more than t = lognα
quorum slices, then with high probability, {1, . . . , k} is a
quorum. Note that
log n
α
= − log n
log (1− p) ≤
log n
p
≤ nk log n.
Recall that Bennett’s inequality [24], when applied to
X ∼ Poisson(λ), yields P (X ≥ λ − x) ≤ e− x22λh(− xλ ),
where h(x) is decreasing in x and bounded above by 2
and h(−1) = 2. Thus for λ = 2nk log n and x = nk log n,
with high probability, P (Yv < nk log n) ≤ e−2nk log(n)
for v = {1, . . . , k}. Thus, with high probability, each
vertex will draw at least lognα quorum slices, and so{1, . . . , k} will be a quorum. By similar reasoning, {k +
1, . . . , 2k} is also a quorum, so QIP does not hold with
high probability.
3.3.2. Lower Bound for Phase Transition.
Theorem 3.2. Assume k = ω(log n). If λ = O(nc) for
some constant c, then Qava exhibits the quorum intersec-
tion property with high probability.
Since O(nk) = O(nlogn) is super-polynomial, our
lower bound states that the phase transition happens after
O(nk) for k > log n.
To prove the theorem, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Let U ⊂ V be a set of vertices with |U | ≥ k.
Under the generative model, the probability that U is a
quorum is
P (U is a quorum) =
(
1− exp
[
−λ (|U | − 1)k−1
(n− 1)k−1
])|U |
,
(3.2)
where (a)b is the falling Pochhammer symbol.
Proof. We have
P (U is a quorum) =
∏
u∈U
P (∃S ∈ Qava(u), S ⊂ U)
=
∏
u∈U
(
1− P (∀S ∈ Qava(u), S 6⊂ U)
)
=
(
1− P (∀S ∈ Qava(u), S 6⊂ U)
)|U |
,
for any fixed u ∈ U . Moreover,
P (∀S ∈ Qava(u), S 6⊂ U)
)
=
∏
S∈Qava(u)
P (S 6⊂ U)
=
∏
S∈Qava(u)
(1− P (S ⊂ U))
= exp
[
−λ (|U | − 1)k−1
(n− 1)k−1
]
,
where in the last step we use that E[aY ] = e(a−1)λ for
Y ∼ Poisson(λ). Putting the above two equations together
yields the desired claim.
Using the lemma, we can now prove our lower bound
for the phase transition.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Note that (|U |−1)k−1(n−1)k−1 =
O(|U |k/nk). From Lemma 3.3, the expected number of
quorums of size m is bounded above by(
n
m
)
(1− e−λmk/nk)m ≤ nm
(
2λ
mk
nk
)m
,
where we use that 1 − e−x ≤ 2x for x > 0. For m =
o(n), the expected number of quorums of size n can be
made arbitrarily small. Thus, with high probability, we
can assume all quora have linear size.
Next, let U be a quorum of linear size, i.e. |U | = dn
for some d. Assume d < 12 . Write k = p log n for constant
p, and let λ = np. Then
P (U is quorum) ≤ (1− exp (−λdk))dn
= (1− exp (−np · dp logn))dn
≤ (1− exp (−np · (1/2)p logn))dn
= (1− e−O(1))dn.
For large n, the above probability can be made expo-
nentially small. Thus, with high probability, there are no
quorums of size ≤ 12n. Since any two sets of size greater
than 12n must have common intersection, it follows that
Qava exhibits QIP with high probability.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a generative model for the
Avalanche consensus protocol, and show that Avalanche
can generate FBAS hypergraphs that satisfy the QIP, and
therefore achieve safety and liveness guarantees similar to
SCP. Because verifying that an FBAS hypergraph satisfies
QIP is an NP-complete problem, we argue that one needs
simulations and statistical arguments like ours to analyze
the SCP in practical settings. More generally, as research
into probabilistic consensus mechanisms has increased
dramatically since the seminal work of Ben-Or [25], there
has been an increasing need for a theoretical framework to
compare different consensus mechanisms. At the moment,
there are a wide variety of proof techniques and guarantees
that, at first glance, appear non-comparable. Moreover, the
differences in the definitions of what it means to achieve
consensus make it hard to discern if a BFT algorithm can
be fairly compared to a probabilistic algorithm. However,
there are a number of similarities hidden within the analy-
ses of distributed consensus protocols, and this work aims
to evince one of these similarities.
In particular, the phase transition that was described
was inspired by transitions that are found in statistical
physics and integrable probability. For instance, the quo-
rum probabilities of Equation 3.2 are equivalent to cluster
size probabilities within the random cluster model under
certain limits [26]. This model, which has a variety of
sharp phase transitions and a complicated phase diagram,
serves as a formal probabilistic tool for analyzing random
cluster formations in graphs. Perhaps, by borrowing tools
from these fields, it will be possible to show that a larger
number of consensus protocols and committee selection
algorithms are related by simple statistical transforma-
tions. Our hope is that such an inquiry would lead to a
simple taxonomy of distributed consensus algorithms and
that this paper, which shows that one consensus algorithm
can be viewed as a randomized realization of another
consensus algorithm, will provide a way to prune this
taxonomy.
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